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REVISITING ALLIED TUBE AND NoERR: THE
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF GREEN BUILDING
LEGISLATION & CASE LAW CONSIDERATIONS FOR
POLICYMAKERS
STEPHEN DEL PERCIO*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past five years, green building legislation has been enacted
across the country at the state and local levels with heightened frequency1
to combat what many legislators and their constituents believe to be an
imminent threat resulting from global climate change.2 While few would
argue against the threat that global warming poses to society's long-term
viability,3 crafting policy without considering its broader legal ramifica-
tions will do much more harm than good for the green building movement.
Of particular concern for purposes of this Article are the potential antitrust
implications implicated by the United States Green Building Council's
('USGBC") Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design ("LEED")
green building rating system.
The USGBC is a Washington, D.C.-based non profit organization,
comprised of "78 local affiliates, more than 20,000 member companies and
organizations, and more than 100,000 LEED Accredited Professionals,"
*Stephen Del Percio is a construction and real estate attorney admitted to practice law
in New York and New Jersey. He is a LEED AP and a member of the construction group
at Arent Fox LLP in New York, where his practice focuses exclusively on servicing the
design, construction, and real estate industries in both litigation and transactional matters,
with particular emphasis on the emerging legal and regulatory issues associated with green
building. Mr. Del Percio is also the publisher of the Green Real Estate Law Journal, an
online forum that explores the intersection of legal issues and green building, available at
http://www.greenrealestatelaw.com. He holds an undergraduate degree in civil engineering
from Columbia and is a 2005 graduate of William & Mary Law School.
1 Between 2003 and 2007, the number of U.S. cities with a green building program
increased by nearly 400 percent. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, Local Leaders in
Sustainability, http://www.aia.org/advocacy/local/programs/AAS075254.
2 Mark Valentine & Desiree Vargas, Green Design and Practice in the Development of
Buildings and Neighborhoods, in ARABELLA ANALYTICAL REPORT 7-9 (Oct. 2007),
available at http://www.arabellaadvisors.comlimages/Green Design and Practice 2007
Update _Arabella Advisors.pdf.
'UNIV. OF COPENHAGEN, SYNTHESIS REPORT CLIMATE CHANGE: GLOBAL RISKS, CHALLENGES,
& DECISIONS 6 (2009), http://climatecongress.ku.dk/pdf/synthesisreport.
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with the goal of transforming "the way buildings and communities are de-
signed, built and operated, enabling an environmentally and socially re-
sponsible, healthy, and prosperous environment that improves the quality
of life. 4 In 1998, the USGBC created the first iteration of LEED, a vol-
untary, consensus-based system that purports to rate the environmental
impact of buildings. Most legislatures, in devising a green building scheme,
have incorporated the LEED system into the text of their legislation,
whether in the form of an incentive or mandate.5 While the LEED system
has, in that respect, been the most successful of the green building rating
systems promulgated by private, third-party organizations such as USGBC,
other systems exist and are vying for market share.6 Green Globes, for
instance, is such a system; promulgated by the Portland, Oregon-based
Green Building Initiative ("GBI"), it has been adopted by at least 18 state
legislatures, though its market share is unquestionably much smaller
than LEED's.7 Green Globes and LEED have been in direct and, at times,
adversarial competition ever since the GBI was founded in 2004 by North
American timber interests.8 Those interests include the Wood Promotion
Network, a consortium of timber industry entities that includes the
American Forest and Paper Association, an organization that promulgates
a forest certification program called the Sustainable Forestry Initiative
("SFI").9 However, the LEED system's more extensive pervasion through
the market carries potential antitrust implications.
4 U.S. Green Building Council, USGBC: About USGBC, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage
.aspx?CMSPageID=124 (last visited Sept. 15,2009). For purposes of this Article, references
to LEED refer to the LEED for New Construction Rating System under the LEED 2009
program. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
5 126 cities, 36 counties, 28 towns, and 36 states have incorporated the LEED rating system
into legislation, executive orders, ordinances, policies, and initiatives. U.S. Green Building
Council, Government Resources, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=
1779 (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
6 See Alex Frangos, Industry Seeks New Green-Building Standard; Timber Business Backs
Wood Friendly'Approach; Critics Call It Self-Serving, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2006, at B6.
' See, e.g., Mark Rossolo, Green Globes Included in President-Elect's Environmental Plan
(Green Bldg. Initiative, Or.), Dec. 8, 2008, http://www.thegbi.org/news/news/2008/news
_20081208_obama-green-globes-environmentalplan.asp (stating that "[a]side from its
inclusion in the new administration's environmental plan, the [Green Globes] system has
been officially recognized by legislation or executive order in 18 states, including Arkansas,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, New Jersey, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia and
Wisconsin.').
'See Frangos, supra note 6.
9 Id.; see also Chris Barneycastle, The Sustainable Forestry Initiative of the American
Forest & Paper Association, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON ARKANSAS FORESTS:
A CONFERENCE ON THE RESULTS OF THE RECENT FOREST SURVEY OF ARKANSAS 110-12
240 [Vol. 34:239
REVISITING ALLIED TUBE AND NOERR
An aspect about the LEED system which has raised concern in the
industry is the limitation on the types of wood it certifies. Since its incep-
tion in 2000, the LEED system's certified wood credit under its Materials
and Resources credit category has only recognized wood products certified
by the Forest Stewardship Council ("FSC") forest certification program. 10
Unlike LEED, Green Globes does not discriminate between preferred wood
product rating systems; rather, it awards credits for wood products that
are certified by FSC, SFI, or the Canadian Standards Association ("CSA").1"
Consequently, as of 2007, only twenty percent of the total amount of certi-
fied wood products in North America was certified by FSC, totaling roughly
seventy-three million acres of North American forests compared to SFI,
which has certified roughly 135 million acres. 12
Many proponents of USGBC and the LEED system feel that Green
Globes was founded by timber industry stakeholders who believed the
smaller total amount of FSC-certified forests in North America, compared
with those certified by SFI, would be detrimental to the business interests
of their constituents as green building programs across the country con-
tinued to increase. 3 They have also vilified Green Globes in the past by
questioning its roots as a timber industry-funded system designed to boost
green building market share for timber products that are not recognized
under the LEED program. 4
Forest certification programs are designed to manage logging prac-
tices in forests by ensuring that, among other things, a sufficient balance
exists between old and young trees in order to preserve a healthy timber
stock. 5 The Germany-based FSC was founded in 1993 and was aimed spe-
cifically at tropical rainforests. 6 In response to FSC's limited focus, SFI
(James M. Guldin, 1997), available at http://www.srs.fs.usda.gov/pubs/gtr/gtr-srs04l/gtr
_srs041--barneycastle01.pdf.
" See McGraw-Hill Construction, The Case for Certified Wood (Oct. 2008), http://mcgraw-
new.buildingmedia.comnarticle-print.php?L6&C=453&P=-4 (stating that the "FSC is cur-
rently the only certified wood system accepted by LEED. Although considered the touch-
stone of all certification programs with the most stringent requirements, there is growing
support for the sentiment that FSC should not be the only LEED-approved system.").
" See SUSTAINABILITY FORESTRY INITIATIVE, SFI WEBINAR SERIES-GREEN BUILDING 24,
31 (2009), http://www.sfiprogram.orgsfi-webinars/pdfs/webinar-green-building-june09.pdf.
12 See Tom Wright & Jim Carlton, FSC's 'Green' Label for Wood Products Gets Growing
Pains, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20,2007, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1193
68082115675124.html.
13 See Frangos, supra note 6.
14 See id.
1' SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 5.
'
6 Wright & Carlton, supra note 12; SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 5.
2009]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLVY REV.
was founded in 1994 to focus on North American forests, but FSC has since
spread its reach out of the tropics to forests across the globe.'7 In addition
to FSC and SFI, more than fifty forest certification standards exist, with
the four major players in North America including FSC, the Sustainable
Forestry Initiative, the Certified Family Forest, and the American Tree
Farm System.'" Each system aims to ensure that forests are replenished
after logging takes place, local and federal laws with respect to logging
are followed, and that timber stocks are not forested or otherwise har-
vested illegally.' 9
The battle over which types of wood products qualify for certain
credits under LEED is taking place in the shadows, but at stake is a sig-
nificant piece of market share for North America's billion dollar timber
industry. This battle is becoming more acute as an increasing number of
state and local governments choose to exclusively adopt the LEED rating
system into legislation and effectively exclude non-FSC-certified wood prod-
ucts from the marketplace.2 ° This battle between LEED and other rating
systems, thus, has given rise to the subject matter of this Article-the
potential antitrust implications of adopting the LEED rating system into
state and local level legislation.
The first part of this Article provided a brief introduction to
USGBC's implicit acknowledgment of LEED's antitrust implications. The
second part of the Article discusses USGBC's response to the criticism it
has received from the LEED system's focus on FSC certification. Next, the
Article provides an overview of the case law that parallels LEED's exclusive
approach to qualifying certified wood products. It does not argue that such
an analysis would be the only line of antitrust attack against either LEED
or USGBC. It does suggest, however, a more narrow antitrust analysis for
either GBI or non-FSC forest certification systems to consider based on
well-settled Supreme Court case law that calls third-party standard-setting
organizations such as USGBC "traditional[] ... objects of antitrust scru-
tiny,"" particularly when creating consensus-based environmental stan-dards that are consequently adopted into state and local-level legislation.22
" See Wright & Carlton, supra note 12; SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, supra note
11, at 5.
18 SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 24.
19 Id. at 5.
21 In Allied Tube, the Supreme Court pointed out market effect in upholding an antitrust
claim against the defendants. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
21 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1987).
22 See infra Part IV.
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It concludes by recommending that policymakers carefully review the
possibility that third-party green building rating systems such as LEED
may-either intentionally or unintentionally, by incorporating other third-
party certification standards, whether in the context of certified wood
products or other products-run afoul of the following line of case law.23
In order to do so, it suggests that policymakers incorporate flexibility into
legislation by allowing projects to choose from a menu of green building
certification systems, whether LEED, Green Globes, or other location-
specific programs.
I. USGBC's RESPONSE TO INDUSTRY CONCERNS OVER LEED'S
EXCLUSIVE APPROACH
As noted above, USGBC has received criticism for exclusively incor-
porating FSC certification within LEED.' In response to the timber in-
dustry's concerns about this approach, in 2006 USGBC asked its Technical
Steering Committee to assist it in reexamining its wood credits and "pro-
pose revised credit language, if appropriate."25 The Steering Committee
received input from "diverse stakeholders, and the support of experts from
the Yale Program of Forest Policy and Governance and Life Cycle Assess-
ment experts at Sylvatica. [sic]"26 The Committee proposed establishing a
set of criteria for evaluating wood certification systems based on gover-
nance, technical standards, accreditation and auditing, and chain of
custody and labeling.27 LEED would, therefore, recognize qualifying wood
certification programs, while affording the non-compliant systems with the
modifications necessary to receive LEED recognition.28
Most instructive of USGBC's attempt to include other wood certi-
fication systems are the amendments being proposed to LEED. More spe-
cifically, the current language in Credit Number 7 under the Materials and
Resources credit category, Certified Wood, states that only certified wood
based materials "certified in accordance with the Forestry Stewardship
2 3 See infra Part V.
24 See Craig Webb, USGBC Opens Door to Ending FSC's Green Wood Monopoly, BUILDER,
Aug. 11, 2008, available at http://www.builderonline.com/green-buildinglusgbc-opens-door
-to-ending-fscs-green-wood-monopoly.aspx.
21 McGraw-Hill Construction, supra note 10.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See id.
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Council's (FSC) Principles and Criteria, for wood building components"
receive credit.29 The proposed amendments to this section, however, would
be more inclusive, certifying wood based materials that "use[d] a minimum
of 50 percent (based on cost) of wood-based materials and products that are
certified in accordance with a forest certification scheme that is recognized
after evaluation against the USGBC Forest Certification System Bench-
mark, for wood building components."3 The second public comment period
critiquing this new language is still taking place, which should invariably
bring out revisions to make the amendment language more clear.3' Once
complete, USGBC's membership will vote on the proposed revisions to
the credit, and USGBC will select consultants who will conduct an
assessment of existing wood certification standards against the Commit-
tee's criteria.32 At an undetermined point in time after that, USGBC will
announce which forest certification standards have satisfied the Commit-
tee's criteria and will earn points under LEED's MR Credit 73' It remains
unclear which, if any, forest certification systems will be recognized by
USGBC, though it is likely safe to assume that FSC will conform to this
new Forest Certification System Benchmark. The antitrust implications
lie, however, in the possibility of LEED continuing to recognize FSC only.
It appears that USGBC's decision to revisit LEED's certified wood
credits was an implicit acknowledgment of the potential for alleged anti-
trust violations. Moreover, controlling antitrust law suggests that a claim
could be brought against USGBC or FSC. These antitrust claims would be
based on LEED's exclusion of products approved by other forest certifica-
tion systems from qualifying for credits under Materials and Resources
Credit Number 7, Certified Wood.' USGBC's concerns may have originated
from remarks made by a GBI representative in January of 2007, where
concerns that "policymakers shouldn't mandate a certain [green building
29 U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED 2009 FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND MAJOR RENOV-
ATIONS 55 (2009), available at http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID= 5546.30 U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION 2009, DRAFr CHANGES TO
MRc7 (2009), available at httpsJ/www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentlD=6231. This is
the language that currently exists in MR Credit 7 across the suite of LEED rating systems.
31 See U.S. Green Building Council, LEED Draft Ballot and Comments, http://www.usgbc
.org/LEEDfLEEDDraftsfRatingSystemVersions.aspx?CMSPageID=1458. The second public
comment period is slated to end October 14, 2009, after this article is sent to publication.
Id.
32 SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, supra note 11, at 35.33 Id.
34 See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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rating] system, [but] should mandate results" were expressed.15 The GBI
representative's comment was made amidst pending green building legis-
lation in Boston, Massachusetts."6 Additionally, the GBI representative
commented that "there [was] clear legal precedent that prohibit[ed] the
government from crafting a law to mandate one business or organization
over another."37 While this remark was likely leveled directly at USGBC
and LEED, the controlling case law and applicable facts suggest a slightly
different-but no less problematic-posture for the purposes of this
Article.3" Important to understanding the applicable case law, however,
is a general understanding of the mechanics of the Sherman Act, which
would provide the basis for an antitrust cause of action.
II. SHERMAN ACT OVERVIEW
The Sherman Act is the federal statute that permits a cause of
action in federal court for anti-competitive business practices.39 In order
" Boston Green Building Law Designed to Avoid Potential Lawsuits, INSIDE GREEN Bus.,
Jan. 10, 2007. It should be noted that the same GBI representative suggested it would
not pursue legal recourse presently or in the future. Id. Boston, however, was seeking to
ease the standard so that projects only had to be certifiable instead of having to receive
LEED certification. Id.
36 See id.; see also Stephen Del Percio, Back to Boston: Revisiting Beantown's Green
Building Legislation, GBNYC, Feb. 12,2007. http://www.greenbuildingsnyc.com/2007/02/
12/back-to-boston-revisting-beantowns-green-building-legislation.
Boston Green Building Laws Designed to Avoid Potential Lawsuit, supra note 35
... [s]ome observers have questioned the logic of requiring a single,
private certification system for commercial use. A source with the...
GBI... says the group has long-questioned the trend of mandating
LEED, saying that policymakers "shouldn't mandate a certain system,
[but] should mandate results." The GBI source says that while there is
clear legal precedent that prohibits the government from crafting a law
to mandate one business or organization over another, the group doesn't
plan legal action against the D.C. law or other laws now or in the future.
"We don't want to bring negative attention to the market," the source
says, noting that GBI "doesn't disagree at the core" with laws mandating
LEED, but the group "just feels it's not the right way to go."
38 See infra Part III.
39 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006). The statute provides that:
[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation,
or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding
10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. Id.
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to successfully allege a Sherman violation, a plaintiff must prove anti-
competitive conduct and injury resulting from that conduct.4 ° Case law
suggests that in order to bring a successful suit against an organization
such as USGBC, a plaintiff must either demonstrate that a standard-
setting organization such as the USGBC discriminated against its product
in order to restrict competition, 41 or that the conduct of the third-party
organization was unduly restrictive.42 Case law also suggests that a claim
could be asserted against a member of the organization, or the organiza-
tion itself.43 However, the lynchpin of this line of antitrust analysis is the
adoption of the LEED system into state- and local-level legislation and
whether it is sufficient proof of market effect."
At the outset, however, it is important to note that USGBC makes
it clear on its website that it:
does not certify, endorse or promote products, services or
companies, nor do we track, list or report data related to
products and their environmental qualities. LEED is a cer-
tification system that deals with the environmental perfor-
mance of buildings based on overall characteristics of the
project. We do not award credits based on the use of par-
ticular products but rather upon meeting the performance
standards set forth in our rating systems. It is up to project
teams to. determine which products are most appropriate
for credit achievement and program requirements.45
Consistent with this seeming impartiality, Materials and Resources Credit
Category, Credit 4 (Recycled Content), Credit 5 (Regional Materials), and
Credit 6 (Rapidly Renewable Materials) do not mandate specific types of
products that will qualify; rather, they set forth percentages of recycled, re-
gional, and renewable materials that will qualify for these credits. 46 Still,
Thus, as noted by the Supreme Court, "Congress has made illegal: 'Every contract, combi-
nation ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States."'
Radiant Burners, Inc., v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 (1961) (quoting
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 49 (1911)).
40 15 U.S.C. § 15 (stating that "any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws nlay sue .... ).
41 See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,'486 U.S. 492,492, 510-11 (1988).
42 See Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. at 659-60.
43 See Am. Soc. of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp!, 456 U.S. 556, 572-73 (1982).
44 See Allied Tube, 492 U.S. at 502-03.45 U.S. Green Building Council, LEED Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.usgbc.org/
DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=1819#Product (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).46 U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, supra note 30, at 52-54. •
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the current language under the Certified Wood section strictly favors the
Forest Stewardship Council. For example, the LEED 2009 New Construc-
tion rating system's Materials and Resources Credit Category still reads,
under Credit 7, that in order to earn the credit, projects must "[u]se a
minimum of 50% (based on cost) of wood-based materials and products that
are certified in accordance with the Forest Stewardship Council's principles
and criteria, for wood building components."47 Although project teams have
the discretion to choose which wood products will be incorporated into the
project in order to satisfy the MR-7 Certified Wood credit, that product
must be certified under the FSC system." If the product has not been cer-
tified under the FSC system, it is effectively excluded from earning credits
for a project under LEED. Thus, in a jurisdiction that has adopted the
LEED certification system, the product that is not certified by the FSC
would effectively be excluded from the marketplace.49 Whether this ex-
clusive approach to conferring LEED certification amounts to antitrust
violations is contingent on case law established by the Supreme Court.
III. CONTROLLING CASE LAW: ANALOGIZING USGBC's
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE TO ALLIED TUBE, NOERR, AND
RADIANT BURNERS
First, it is important to note that the Supreme Court has held in a
line of well-settled case law that "private standard-setting associations
have traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny."'5 The USGBC, as a
consequence of this principle and the composition of the organization,
would be the type of association susceptible to antitrust scrutiny. Three
cases, Allied Thbe & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., E. R.R. Presidents
47 Id. at 55. Cf. U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED 2009 FOR CORE AND SHELL
DEVELOPMENT 55 (2009), http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=5544; U.S.
GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED 2009 FOR COMMERCIAL INTERIORS 36 (2009), http://www
.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=5543; U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, LEED 2009
FOR SCHOOLS NEW CONSTRUCTIONAND MAJOR RENOVATIONS 57 (2009), http://www.usgbc
.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=5547 (under LEED 2009, Certified Wood credits are
worth the same point value across the New Construction, Core and Shell, Commercial
Interiors, and Schools rating systems).
48 See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 55.
49 See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, GREEN BUILDING, USGBC AND LEED (2009), http://
www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=1991 [hereinafter GREEN BUILDING, USGBC
AND LEED] (claiming that 36 states and 190 local governments have adopted the LEED
certification system).
o Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509-11 (1988).
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Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., and Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. further illuminate the applicability of control-
ling case law to USGBC and, particularly its LEED system.
The seminal case in this arena is Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v.
Indian Head, Inc. The Allied Tube Court found that a member of the
National Fire Protection Association violated the Sherman Act and that
Noerr immunity did not apply.5 The plaintiff-respondent in the case was
a manufacturer of plastic electrical conduit who claimed that the petitioner,
a rival Association member who manufactured steel conduit, violated the
Sherman Act by packing the Association's annual meeting with new mem-
bers for the sole purpose of voting to exclude plastic conduit from the Associ-
ation's National Electric Code.52 At the time, almost all of the electrical
conduit sold and used across the country was made of steel.5" The plaintiff
claimed that its plastic conduit was more pliable, cost less to install, and
was less susceptible to short-circuiting.54 Nevertheless, the rival manufac-
turer recruited 230 steel-related interests to attend the Association's
annual meeting and vote against the plaintiffs proposal to include plastic
conduit in the Code.55 Plaintiffs proposal was rejected and it sued the rival
Association member, claiming unlawful restraint of trade under the Sher-
man Act.5" The Second Circuit reversed the district court's directed verdict
granting Noerr immunity to the steel manufacturer's actions, and the steel
manufacturer appealed.57
Upon granting certiorari, the Court called the Code "the most in-
fluential electrical code in the nation," and noted that many governments
had adopted it into law by reference.5" Further, the Court observed that
"members of such associations often have economic incentives to restrain
competition and that the product standards set by such associations have
a serious potential for anticompetitive harm." 9 A significant factor for
5 Id. at 495. See infra notes 64-69.
52 Id. at 496.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 496-97.
" Allied Tbe, 486 U.S. at 497.57 Id. at 499.
5 Id. at 495.
59 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 500; see also id. at n5 (quoting 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law 1503,
p. 373 (1986)) ("Product standardization might impair competition in several ways....
[It) might deprive some consumers of a desired product, eliminate quality competition,
exclude rival producers, or facilitate oligopolistic pricing by easing rivals' ability to monitor
each other's prices.").
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the Court in finding anticompetitive effect, however, was the "predictable
adoption of the Code into law by a large number of state and local govern-
ments."'6 This is particularly relevant for purposes of this Article because
of the continued state and local adoptions of the LEED rating system.6'
The Court held that the defendant could not "bias the [standard-setting]
process" by "stacking the Association with decision-makers sharing the
entity's economic interest in restraining competition" and not expect
antitrust liability.62
In order to shield itself from antitrust liability, the defendant in
Allied Thbe sought Noerr immunity, which the Supreme Court rejected.6"
The Noerr doctrine, which the Supreme Court first articulated in E. R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,4 provides that a party
who petitions the government for some type of redress is generally immune
from antitrust liability, even if there is an improper purpose or motive be-
hind the petition.65 For example, in Noerr, the defendant railroad compa-
nies, employing a variety of deceptive and unethical measures, campaigned
for legislation that they believed would destroy the nascent trucking indus-
try." Nevertheless, the Court, found that the railroad company's actions
were political and held that its conduct was immune from antitrust liability
because the Sherman Act was designed to regulate "business activity" and
not "political activity."6 Framing the discussion in this manner, the Court
held that because "the right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by
the Bill of Rights... we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an
intent to invade these freedoms."' Accordingly, "'[w]here a restraint upon
60 Id. at 502-03.
61 See GREEN BUILDING, USGBC AND LEED, supra note 50 (claiming that 36 states and
190 local governments have adopted the LEED certification system); see also Stephen T.
Del Percio, Legal Issues Arising out of Green Building Legislation, ENTREPRENEUR,
Fall 2008, http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/192452490.html.
62 Id. at 511.
61 Id. at 495.
' E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1960).
65 See id. at 139-40, 142-44.
6 See id. at 129-30. The twenty-four railroads conspired by retaining a public relations
firm to
... to conduct a publicity campaign against the truckers designed to
foster the adoption and retention of laws and law enforcement practices
destructive of the trucking business, to create an atmosphere of distaste
for the truckers among the general public, and to impair the relation-
ships existing between the truckers and their customers. Id. at 129.67 Id. at 137.
68 Id. at 138.
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trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as op-
posed to private action,' those urging the governmental action enjoy abso-
lute immunity from antitrust liability for the anticompetitive restraint."69
The petitioner in Allied Tube unsuccessfully argued for Noerr im-
munity.7 ° Relying on its arguments at trial, the petitioner suggested that
Noerr immunity applied because the Association was "akin to a legisla-
ture" and that it used "methods consistent with acceptable standards of
political action, genuinely intended to influence the [Association] with
respect to the National Electrical Code, and to thereby influence the
various state and legislative bodies which adopt the [Code]."71 The Allied
Tube Court, however, refused to extend such protections to the Associa-
tion. The Court, acknowledging some validity in the petitioner's argument,
held that although Noerr immunity was not limited to 'direct' petitioning
of government officials, "the Noerr doctrine [did] not immunize every
concerted effort that [was] genuinely intended to influence governmental.
action."73 The Association thus could not "be treated as a quasi-legislative
body simply because legislatures routinely adopt [ed] the Code the Associ-
ation publishe[d]" because no government conferred official authority
onto it and the Association was composed of "persons with economic
incentives to restrain trade."74 Therefore, the "context and nature of [the
P]etitioner's efforts to influence the Code persuade[d theCourt] that the
validity of those efforts must, despite their political impact, be evaluated
under the standards of conduct setforth by the antitrust laws that govern
the private standard-setting process."75
A subsequent case to Allied Tube, Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples
Gas Light & Coke Co., suggests a slightly alternative antitrust argu-
ment.76 In Radiant Burners, the lower courts dismissed an antitrust claim
brought by a manufacturer of a ceramic gas burner against the American
Gas Association ("AGA") and ten of its member constituents.77 The plain-
tiff alleged that the AGA and Utility members "refuse[d] to provide gas for
9 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499 (quoting Noerr
Motor Freight, 365 U.S. at 136).
70 See id. at 509-10.
71 Id. at 498-99.
72 Id. at 495, 509-10.
71 Id. at 503.
74 Id. at 501.
7'Allied Thbe, 486 U.S. at 509.7
' Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
77 Id. at 657.
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use in the plaintiffs Radiant Burner[s]" because its burner was not ap-
proved by AGA.7" Included in AGA's "seal of approval" process were tests
"influenced by respondents, some of whom [were] in competition with
petitioner, and thus its determinations [could] be made 'arbitrarily and
capriciously."'79 To further support its position, the petitioner posited
that although its Ceramic Burner was "safer and more efficient than, and
just as durable as, gas burners" approved by AGA, its gas burner was not
approved.' Therefore, AGA would not provide gas for use in the plaintiff's
burner thus excluding it from the marketplace.81
The Seventh Circuit, finding plaintiffs argument unpersuasive,
affirmed defendant's motion to dismiss. The court held that "[in] the ab-
sence of a per se violation," an injured competitor, such as the plaintiff,
is afforded protection under the Sherman Act when "the public at large
suffers economic harm.""2 Furthermore, the plaintiff had failed to demon-
strate public harm or fewer sales of conversion gas burners." The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that "the conspiratorial refusal 'to provide gas for
use in the plaintiffs Radiant Burner[s] [because they] are not approved
by AGA'.. .falls within one of the 'classes of restraints which from their
'nature dr character' are unduly restrictive, and hence forbidden by"' the
Sherman Act.' Additionally, the courts should not attempt to determine
whether public harm occurred because Congress has its own criteria."8
Lastly, any alleged conspiracy to "interfere with the natural flow of inter-
state commerce... is not to be tolerated.., because the victim... is so
small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy." 6
IV. DISCUSSION: APPLICATION OF ALLIED TUBE, NOERR, AND
RADIANT BURNERS TO USGBC's LEED RATING SYSTEM
In assessing whether the Allied Tube standard is potentially appli-
cable to USGBC and its LEED rating system, thus attaching antitrust
liability, it is important to consider the structure of USGBC. USGBC is
78 Id. at 658.
79!d.
80 Id. at 656.
81 See id.
82Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. at 659 (quoting Radiant Burners, Inc., v. Peoples Gas Light
& Coke Co., 273 F.2d 196, 200 (7th Cir. 1960)).83 Id.
8 4Id. at 659-60.
85 Id. at 660.
8 6 Id.
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composed of members who are companies having the same "horizontal
and vertical business relations" as the Association in Allied Tube, which
the Court looked at with suspicion.87 Further, the USGBC and its constitu-
ent members participate in annual meetings, educational seminars, and
actively champion the development process for the suite of LEED rating
systems." These facts suggest that USGBC could exert the same negative
influence present in Allied Tube if its constituents use the educational
opportunities in such a manner. Additionally, because many state and
local governments incorporate the LEED rating system into legislation,
this potential is exacerbated.
USGBC's Antitrust Compliance Policy also seems to implicitly
acknowledge that its organizational structure subjects it to antitrust
scrutiny. The Policy states that "from an antitrust standpoint, [USGBC]
will be commonly referred to as a trade association. [Moreover, tirade orga-
nizations are subject to antitrust scrutiny because they involve meetings
of competitors, but they frequently engage in a number of legitimate, pro-
competitive and lawful activities." 9 Implicit in recognizing that these
types of organizations engage in legitimate and procompetitive activities
is an understanding that they can potentially engage in illegitimate activ-
ities designed to constrain interstate trade. The Antitrust Compliance
Policy thus warns constituents that:
[i]n order to avoid allegations of illegal price signaling,
there should be no communications or discussions between
any USGBC members either at USGBC meetings or at any
other time about (a) current or future prices, pricing plans
or production plans, or (b) announcements of price changes
or output changes.... As a general matter, each member
should be extremely careful and seek legal advice before
engaging in any conduct that could possibly provide evi-
dence to support allegations of collusion.9
17 See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, supra note 29, at I; U.S. Green Building Council, About
Membership, http://www.usgbc.org/DisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=1716 (last visited
Sept. 15, 2009).
" See U.S. Green Building Council, Events Conference Calendar, http://www.usgbc.org/
EventsEventsConferenceCalendar.aspx?PageD=17948&CMSPageD=1722 (last visited
Sept. 15, 2009) (for types of activities available to USGBC members); see also U.S. Green
Building Council, About Committees, http://www.usgbc.orgDisplayPage.aspx?CMSPageID=-
1742 (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
89 U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, U.S. GREEN BUILDING ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE POLICY 10
(2005), http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID.
9"Id. at 7.
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The potential therefore exists that the activities in which USGBC and its
constituents engage could present the same type of antitrust problems
as alleged in Allied Tube.
However, as is suggested in Radiant Burners, the gross violations
of the Sherman Act discussed in the Allied Tube case are not necessary
to establish a viable antitrust claim. First, USGBC itself includes a large
number of industry stakeholders who actively participate in the organiza-
tion's standard-setting process.9' It is in these meetings that USGBC
decides which types of woods qualify for the Certified Wood credit, which
could be a capricious or unreasonable process. Thus, a manufacturer of non-
FSC certified wood products, relying on Radiant Burners, might allege that
LEED's standard-setting process is not based on objective standards, but
is instead influenced by USGBC's stakeholders, whose FSC-certified wood
products are in direct competition with the manufacturer.
An additional point of concern is LEED's exclusive adoption of FSC
certification. Other certification systems that certify woods other than those
certified by the FSC and promote similar goals could raise antitrust con-
cerns rooted in the Radiant Burners logic. Both USGBC stakeholders and
policymakers should thus carefully consider whether any similar certifi-
cation regimes, which might raise similar antitrust questions at some
point in the future, are being incorporated by reference into LEED.92
USGBC and its constituents might try to avail themselves of Noerr
immunity in the event that a party were to allege misconduct in connection
with the LEED standard-setting process. Applying the Noerr standards dis-
cussed in Allied Tube suggests that the USGBC and its constituents would
not enjoy Noerr immunity for noxious conduct during the LEED standard
setting process, regardless of how pervasive the LEED rating system be-
comes in state- and local-level legislation.93 This is because such activities
would be taking place within a private standard setting process instead
of the political arena.94 Additionally, many governments are adopting the
91 U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, supra note 29, at I.
92 U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LEADERSHIP IN ENERGYAND ENVIRON-
MENTAL DESIGN ENVIRONMENTAL RATING SYSTEM A TOOL MARKET TRANSFORMATION 6
(2006), http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=2039.
" See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509-10 (1988)
(stating that where "an economically interested party exercises decision-making authority
in formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises market partici-
pants, that party enjoys no Noerr immunity from any antitrust liability flowing from the
effect the standard has of its own force in the marketplace.').
' See id. at 506-10 (1988).
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LEED rating system relying on USGBC's expertise. Thus, USGBC's sug-
gestion on its Antitrust Compliance Policy that "[tihe antitrust laws pro-
vide no immunity for trade organization or association activities," is in
accordance with established case law.95 Naturally, however, Noerr immu-
nity would apply to organizations such as USGBC if any noxious conduct
was strictly aimed at influencing legislation.96
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
This Article is not suggesting that the USGBC or any of its members
are engaging or have engaged in the type of conduct that was problematic
for the Supreme Court in Allied Thbe. Rather, it has presented a green
building paradigm where antitrust case law may be applicable. Thus,
although the foregoing antitrust analysis is theoretical, it does suggest
some important practical considerations in terms of how state and local
governments create green building legislation. It also underscores the
point that there should be flexibility in how such legislation is imple-
mented. The Court in Allied Tbe, for example, specifically pointed to leg-
islation as the basis of proof for market effect-once the Code was adopted
into law by a sufficient number of state and local governments, the plain-
tiff manufacturer was effectively excluded from the marketplace.97 While
it may remain too early for a plaintiff to prove the market effect prong of
a Sherman analysis based upon the number of state and local governments
that have incorporated LEED into legislation to date,9" it is prudent for
legislation to allow for flexibility, particularly while uncertainty remains
over what additional forest certification standards, if any, will be incor-
porated into the revised MR-7 Certified Wood credit.
USGBC's local chapters must also remain mindful of the foregoing
antitrust concerns. In early 2009, the Cascadia chapter of the USGBC e-
mailed its members and asked them to call state legislators to lobby for
them to exclude Green Globes from state-level legislation.9" While this
95 Id.
' See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 142-45
(1960).
97 See id. at 495--96.
98 See U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, GUIDANCE TO LOCAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS 2
(2009), available at http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=6131.
" See LEED v. Green Globes, State Legislature Dukes It Out, SEATTLE DAILY J. OF
COMMERCE, Feb. 19, 2009, http://www.djc.com/blogs/BuildingGreen/2009/02/19/leed-vs
-green-globes-state-legislature-dukes-it-out. The email stated that "Green Globes was
created by the timber and chemical lobbies as a much weaker alternative to LEED," and
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might be the type of political activity protected under Noerr, it should sound
alarm bells for the type of conduct that "does not take place in the open
political arena, where partisanship is the hallmark of decision-making and,
but within the confines of a private standard-setting process."1
Finally, state and local governments should consider green building
legislation that would not exclude other types of rating systems, such as
Green Globes or other types of location-specific programs. For example,
both Boston, Massachusetts and Dallas, Texas allow projects to satisfy
applicable legislation through being deemed "LEED Certifiable" or com-
pliant with the Green Built North Texas standard, respectively. ° As green
building legislation continues to proliferate, it will be interesting to observe
whether any of the theoretical antitrust concerns raised in this Article
mature into a more concrete body of green building law that rests on the
underpinnings of Allied Thbe, Radiant Burners, or Noerr.
claimed that the Green Globes system is "untested, funded by industry and requires no
third party verification." Id.
'00 Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 506.
101 Green is the New Building Standard in Dallas, ENVTL. NEWSWIRE SERv., Apr. 15, 2008,
http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr2008/2008-04-15-092.asp.
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